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Fiscal Deficit Forecasts by International Institutions: Evidence for a Double Standard? 
Abstract 
Fiscal forecasts produced by international financial institutions came under strong criticism 
after the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis due to overly optimistic estimates for heavily indebted 
countries like Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Presently, in the face of strong divisions within the 
European political landscape, international organizations have also been accused of applying a 
double standard. Opponents often claim those organizations depict a more negative picture for 
governments described as populist in the mainstream media. The aim of this paper is to evaluate 
fiscal forecasts provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Commission 
(EC), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Our 
analysis is based on a panel of European Union economies, other OECD members, and large 
non-OECD economies (e.g., China). Five years after the Sovereign debt crisis, we still find 
negative phenomenon reported earlier in the literature. In Europe, all organizations 
systematically present overly optimistic deficit forecasts for Portugal, Spain, and, to a lower 
extent, for Italy. Moreover, the EC and OECD are being indulgent to countries under the 
excessive deficit procedure. There is also an evidence for strong autocorrelation of ex-post 
fiscal forecast errors. On the other hand, we find no strong evidence suggesting that fiscal 
forecasts stigmatize the governments accused of populism or violating the rule of law. Finally, 
in the case of European emerging economies, some kind of wishful thinking is present. For 
example, the EC overestimates governments’ propensity to tighten fiscal policy during the 
expansion period of a business cycle and forecasts an overly pessimistic picture during a 
slowdown. 
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1. Introduction 
The problem of fiscal forecast accuracy plays a relevant role in the European Union (EU) 
countries. According to the Stability and Growth Pact, member states are obliged to keep their 
government fiscal deficits under 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) and public debt below 
60% of GDP. Furthermore, each country is obliged to achieve the so-called medium-term 
objective (MTO) – a desired level of structural balance dependent on nominal GDP growth 
rate, interest rates etc. In case when countries do not comply European Commission (EC) 
invokes so called Excessive deficit procedure (EDP). Under its corrective arm government are 
obliged to reduce imbalance, otherwise EC impose financial sanctions e.g. freeze of EU funds 
or financial penalties up to 0.5% of GDP. Public finances are also monitored by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), but their recommendations are less binding. 
Unfortunately, most recent experiences undermine the credibility of European fiscal rules and 
the international supervision of the IMF and OECD (e.g., Belke, 2017). The criticism grew 
stronger after the European sovereign debt crisis. First, the fiscal forecast overestimated the 
governments’ ability to consolidate public finances in indebted Portugal, Italy, and Spain. 
Second, the EC selectively released France, Portugal and Spain from the sanctions. 
The problem has intensified in recent years. The political fragmentation in the EU (see, e.g., 
Gidron & Hall, 2017) has led to strong accusations of applying a double standard toward 
favored and unfavored national governments. What was probably the most vocal clash occurred 
between Italy and France (Reuters, 2018). The EC forced the Italian government to lower its 
expected deficit for 2019 from 2.4% of GDP to 2.04%. At the same time, France was allowed 
to temporarily exceed the 3% threshold to fulfill promises pledged to the Yellow Jackets 
movement (fr. Gilets Jaunes). The deputy prime minister of Italy, Matteo Salvini, publicly 
denounced the approach of French commissioner, Pierre Moscovicci. 
The reverberation of this conflict was also visible in the deficit forecast of the IMF. Despite 
Lega Nord-Five Star Movement declarations that they would lower the deficit after 2019, the 
IMF analysts predict constant deterioration. This assessment may be correct, especially given 
the costly pledges of, e.g., universal income, lower VAT, and lower retirement age. However, 
during the previous Renzi government in Italy, the IMF frequently and consistently provided 
overly optimistic forecasts, despite the worsening realities of the government budgets. The 
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evolution of the IMF forecasts for Italy in the last five years is presented in Figure 1. The errors 
in the forecasts in the previous years could undermine the credibility of the institution. 
Figure 1: IMF deficit forecast for Italy – World Economic Outlook (WEO) October Editions. 
 
 
Each line represents forecasts available in different years. The 2018 edition (black solid line) 
provides up to date estimate of 2017 government deficit and forecast from 2018 to 2023.  
Source: IMF WEO database  
Another interesting example is Poland. Since 2016, the PiS (Law and Justice) government has 
been in open conflict with the EC regarding the rule of law, and the EC has, for two consecutive 
years, reduced the expected deficit in their forecast (Figure 2). The problem is complex. The 
ruling party introduced generous social programs and, at the same time, successfully improved 
the collection of tax revenues (Poniatowski et al., 2018). This increase in revenues was hardly 
predictable. Furthermore, if the tax collectors had been unsuccessful, more negative scenarios 
would have been likely. The literature on this subject highlights the negative link between 
damage to institutional quality and attachment to disciplinary fiscal rules (e.g., Wyplosz, 2012). 
Therefore, more cautious forecasts could be proof of responsibility. If the EC absolutely trusted 
the governmental forecasts and PiS failed to improve collection, the institution would expose 
the bondholders to the greater credit risk.  
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Figure 2: European Commission deficit forecast for Poland - Winter Editions. 
 
Source: European Commission forecast – statistical annex  
Our aim is to determine whether international institutions tend to apply different standards in 
the assessment of public finances for governments described as populist (e.g., Polish PiS, 
Hungarian Fidesz, or Romanian PSD). We applied a panel study to answer this question. 
We find no strong evidence suggesting that fiscal forecasts stigmatize governments accused of 
populism or violating the rule of law. On the other hand, our study shows that international 
institutions do tend to be more lenient to indebted countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy. 
In the case of the EC and the OECD, the bias was also greater for economies under the 
corrective arm of the EC excessive deficit procedure. In addition, there are cyclical problems 
related to long-term forecasts for emerging European economies: the EC tends to overestimate 
the propensity to consolidate public finances during expansion and presents an overly 
pessimistic picture during a slowdown. Finally, we also found a strong serial correlation 
between forecast errors. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an in-depth literature review 
regarding fiscal forecast accuracy. Section 3 describes the forecasting procedures of 
international institutions and the content of our datasets. Section 4 presents the methodology 
of our research. Section 5 discusses our empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Literature Review 
This section provides an insight into the subject of fiscal situation forecasting performance and 
its institutional implications. Debate on the topic effectively started at the beginning of the new 
millennium. Short-term estimates of current year deficits (as a percentage of GDP) provided 
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by international financial institutions such as the OECD or the IMF came under severe 
criticism, as they were frequently less accurate than the consensus of professional forecasters 
(Pons, 2000; Batchelor, 2001). Furthermore, some authors highlighted the lack of statistical 
efficiency and inconsistency of forecasts for G8 countries (Artis & Marcellino, 2001); there 
were examples of countries where a significant positive (Japan, Italy) or negative (Canada) 
forecast bias occurred. This phenomenon was explained by an “asymmetrical loss function” in 
countries where deficit forecasts were politically sensitive, in other words, due to 
implementation of new fiscal policies, international institutions tended to provide cautious 
estimates. 
The accuracy of forecasts prepared by public institutions likely improved within the next five 
years or greater interest was related to the long-term forecasts. As a result, the topic of the 
difference between the forecasts of international agencies and government institutions began 
to dominate in the literature. According to the majority of authors, deficit forecasts prepared 
by national governments suffered from political motivations. Their performance was less 
accurate, despite the use of superior information which is not available outside the ministries 
of finance or other budgeting entities (Brück & Tilman, 2005; Jonung et al., 2006; Leal et al., 
2008; Merola & Pérez, 2012). 
Positive bias in governments forecasts has been rationalized. In contrast to international 
agencies, government entities can use detailed information on tax collection or planned 
expenditures. At the same time, politicians have strong motivations to present overly optimistic 
macroeconomic forecasts (in comparison to future realizations) and to depict success stories of 
their current policies, for instance, by presenting remarkably strong GDP growth or high wage 
dynamics, and neglecting to include high unemployment rates (Brück & Tilman, 2005). 
Moreover, such forecasts are prone to the political cycle—governing parties have the 
temptation to increase spending and boost consumption prior to elections to influence the 
voting outcome. In order to prevent misleading of stakeholders (e.g. bond holders, societies), 
academics highlight the need for international supervision of fiscal policies (Jonung et al., 
2006). 
Unfortunately, research on fiscal supervision and forecast accuracy suggests that external 
forecasts are also prone to the previously mentioned problems. Some authors (e.g., Leal et al., 
2008; Merola & Pérez, 2012) have confirmed the supremacy of the EC/IMF over national 
agencies in accurately predicting outcomes of economic policies in the G8 space. But their 
analyses also confirmed the existence of the same problems typically seen in the governments’ 
 6 
 
projections including systematic positive bias and the existence of the influence of political 
cycles in the forecasts’ errors. In addition, the authors highlighted another problem: the forecast 
errors of national governments and international institutions tend to be correlated with each 
other. These findings likely imply overconfidence of the external forecasters in the information 
provided by national authorities. 
Another strong critique of independent agencies’ forecasts came after the European sovereign 
debt crisis. The example of Greece prior to the introduction of ECB-EC-IMF economic 
adjustment programs provides a situation where both the EC and the IMF consistently 
maintained forecasts suggesting prompt deficit reduction, despite that country having missed 
selected targets, year after year, even prior to the crisis. Furthermore, Greece was able to 
mislead both economists from the EC and statisticians from Eurostat about its real economic 
performance. 
Beetsma et al. (2013) and Frankel and Schreger (2013) pointed out that the Greek case was not 
the only one where the forecast failed to describe reality. The fiscal projections of EC tended 
to present overly rapid fiscal consolidation in EU countries under corrective arm of the 
excessive deficit procedure. Furthermore, the problem of over-optimistic forecasts has not been 
evident in other developed economies with even larger deficits (i.e., the United States and 
Japan). Thus, the problem of bias was not related, for example, to government investment 
activity, but rather to overconfidence in the corrective action of EDP procedure (Pina & Venes, 
2011). 
3. International Deficit Forecasts 
This section describes the dataset used in this research. Government deficit/surplus forecasts 
are published semiannually by international institutions. Our first data source is the IMF World 
Economic Outlook report (WEO), published in April and October. There are also two interim 
rounds of forecast updates (in January and July), where only new GDP growth estimates are 
published. 
The IMF’s database published simultaneously with the report contains information for 194 
countries. We selected 36 of these to construct our sample. The selected countries include EU 
and OECD members, as well as other large non-OECD economies (e.g., China, Russia). We 
excluded economies with episodes of adjustment bailout programs (i.e., Greece, Cyprus) or 
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with severe banking crises (i.e., Ireland, Iceland, Slovenia). The summary of investigated 
countries is presented in Table 1. 
The data used is from 2008 to October 2018 (last release at the moment of writing). Prior to 
this period, the IMF did not report deficit forecasts for some of the emerging European 
economies of interest (e.g., the Czech Republic, Poland). The database contains information 
about government net lending or borrowing expressed as a percentage of GDP. Amongst 
macroeconomic variables, we use information about annual dynamics of GDP growth, its 
deflator, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We also use time series of the current account 
balance as a percentage of GDP to account for the twin deficit theorem2 (e.g., Piersanti, 2000; 
Corsetti & Müller, 2006). 
Each forecast covers a five-year horizon. We analyzed estimates for the current year (i.e., when 
the report was published) called “nowcasts” and for the next three years. For example, from 
the report published in April 2015, we collected the nowcast estimate for 2015 and the estimates 
for 2016, 2017, and 2018 only.  
The next source of data are the EC forecasts. Similar to the IMF, the EC also revises its 
forecasts twice per annum and provides two interim rounds where GDP forecasts are updated. 
The deficit forecasts are published during the spring and autumn (usually in April-May and 
November). The database contains information for 28 member states, the United States, and 
Japan. We decided not to use information regarding candidate countries (e.g., Turkey) due to 
a short history, inconsistent reporting, and missing forecasts. 
The number of indicators provided by the EC is greater than the number in the IMF reports. 
Statistical annexes also include information regarding the detailed structure of GDP, including 
public and private consumption expenditure, or gross fixed capital formation. Furthermore, 
labor market indicators include compensation of employees. 
The EC forecasts also have a much shorter horizon of two years. In the spring round, the 
institution provides estimates for the current and next years. In the autumn round, estimates 
with a two-year horizon are also available. For example, the report published in November 
2015 contained forecasts for 2015, 2016, and 2017. The horizon did not change in the next 
spring release, which provided information for 2016 and 2017. 
                                                 
2 The theorem assumes a common and positive relationship between fiscal and current account deficits in the long 
term; e.g., an increase of government expenditures financed by debt increase should widen the external imbalance. 
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Finally, we also use OECD economic outlook forecasts. The procedure of the update is 
semiannual and similar to that of the EC, but forecasts are published later compared to the IMF 
and EC (i.e., in May and December). The number of macroeconomic variables provided by the 
OECD is the same as in the report produced by the EC. The database contains information 
about: GDP, private and public consumption forecasts, CPI inflation and various price 
deflators, current account balances, and compensation of employees. The OECD produces 
forecasts for a similar horizon to the EC and shorter than the horizon of the IMF. 
4. Methodology 
The aim of our analysis is to verify whether international financial institutions provide biased 
forecasts in relation to the different EU countries. We repeat the calculations previously used 
in the literature (e.g., Artis & Marcellino, 2001; Brück & Tilman, 2005; Pina & Venes, 2011). 
The starting point for our analysis is the following model: 
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 ∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡,ℎ + 𝑒𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a final realization of the deficit in year t, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡,ℎ describes a forecast 
for year t prepared in the horizon h. For example, when h = 2, this indicates a forecast prepared 
two years prior to data realization. 
If the forecasts are unbiased, the parameter 𝑎0 should be statistically insignificant and 𝑎1 equal 
to one. Therefore, all forecast errors should be well described by random disturbances (𝑒𝑡). We 
assume there is no multiplicative error in the forecasts and that 𝑎1 = 1. Therefore, equation (1) 
is transformed into: 
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡,ℎ = 𝑎0 + 𝑒𝑡   (2) 
Next, we attempt to identify the factors, which may explain forecast errors. First, fiscal 
forecasts related to revenue collection depend on the realization of macroeconomic 
assumptions regarding GDP growth and its structure (e.g., private consumption and gross fixed 
capital formation), inflation, and wages. Second, the data on both fiscal revenues and 
expenditures are prone to revisions, such as in the process of consolidation of public sector 
finances. As a result, forecasters are sometimes preparing their estimates based on incomplete 
information about the current state of public finances. This phenomenon should result in 
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systematic and different errors between the countries, as data collection and revision 
procedures may vary. To account for these problems, we expand equation (2) to: 
𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑡,ℎ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑋 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑋 +  𝑎2𝑋 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑋
3 +  𝑎3 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡−1,ℎ + 𝑢𝑡  (3) 
where 𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑡,ℎ stands for the error of financial institutions’ forecast (𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡,ℎ), 
𝑚𝑎𝑋 describes the vector of macroeconomic assumptions, 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡−1,ℎ measures the magnitude of 
previous year deficit revisions between the moment when the forecasts were formulated and 
their final values. Also, 𝑎0, 𝑎𝑋, 𝑎2𝑋, and 𝑎3 are estimated parameters, and 𝑢𝑡 is the equation 
residual. We introduced the third power of macroeconomic assumptions error to reflect 
stronger deficit increases during more severe downturns. In the case of unbiased forecasts, 
parameter 𝑎0 should be equal to 0 (statistically insignificant). Parameters describing 
macroeconomic variables 𝑎𝑋 and 𝑎2𝑋 are expected to be positive, for example, better activity, 
labor market conditions, or higher inflation should result in lower deficits. 
As the next step, we introduce control variables describing both political and institutional 
factors. We use a panel structure to derive both cross-country and period fixed effects. Then 
we add variables describing whether the European Commission opened excessive deficit 
procedure against the country (𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑡), whether World Bank governance indicators describe the 
government as dedicated to preserving the rule of law (𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒_𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑡), and whether the 
government is described as populist (or Eurosceptic) by the mainstream European press (e.g. 
Guardian 2018, BBC 2019 - 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡). Five separate dummies take positive value when they 
describe one of governments being in power: Polish PiS, Romanian PSD, Italian M5N and 
Lega Nord coalition and Hungarian Orban’s Fidesz and negative otherwise. Due to the positive 
result of the test for autocorrelation, we also include the deficit forecast error for the horizon h 
related to previous reports (𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑡−1,ℎ). The final equation has following form: 
𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑡,ℎ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑋 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑋 +  𝑎2 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡−1,ℎ  +  𝑎𝑋2 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑋
3 + 𝑎3 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝑎4
∗ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 + 𝑎5 ∗ 𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑡−1,ℎ + 𝑎𝐷 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡   
(4) 
where 𝜇 is a cross-country effect and 𝜑𝑡 is a period effect. Our hypothesis states that values of 
𝜇 are skewed regionally. Furthermore, we expect the beta parameters corresponding to political 
variables to be statistically significant. 
We are using White’s diagonal method to achieve standard errors, that are robust to 
observation-specific heteroscedasticity in the disturbances, but not to correlation between 
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residuals for different observations. The equations presented in tables 2–5 are the result of this 
estimation. We also repeated the computation with White’s period method, which assumes that 
the errors for a cross-section are heteroskedastic and serially correlated (cross-section 
clustered). The modification of estimation techniques does not alter the final conclusions. 
5. Estimation Results 
This chapter presents a summary of the outcomes of our research. The full detailed estimates 
of the models are available in tables 2–5. 
The estimated models indicate three negative phenomena visible in the evaluated forecasts. 
First and least troublesome - each of the international institution forecasts has a systematic 
negative bias (forecast are more pessimistic comparing to further realizations): the parameter 
𝑎0 is non-zero and is statistically significant in the present and next year horizons. The largest 
bias is present in the EC case and amounts, respectively, to 0.28 and 0.47pp (percentage points). 
The OECD systematically provides overly optimistic forecasts for the current year (T0) by 
0.32pp, but bias is lower in the one-year horizon (0.16pp). Finally, the bias presented in 
forecasts provided by the IMF is the lowest and equals, respectively, 0.10pp and 0.17pp. Our 
findings are contrarian to the previous literature on this subject. Researchers for G8 countries 
reported positive bias e.g. Beetsma et al. (2013) and Frankel and Schreger (2013). 
Second, the forecast errors of government deficits are not randomly distributed; estimates are 
prone to autocorrelation problems. Therefore, we inserted an autoregressive component in each 
equation. In each case, these parameters were statistically significant. The values of this beta 
parameter were highest in the IMF case—close to 0.5 for each forecast horizon. Beta estimates 
for the OECD and EC cases were lower and more dispersed (equal to 0.22–0.47). 
Third, the cross-section fixed effects were statistically significant in nearly every equation. In 
the EU, overly optimistic forecasts are particularly visible for Portugal and Spain, and, in the 
case of long-term estimates, for Italy. On the other hand, the improvement of fiscal balance 
after the global financial crisis was underestimated for Denmark and the Czech Republic. For  
countries outside the EU, the European-based institutions (EC and OECD) tend to present 
overly optimistic estimates regarding the United States. 
Amongst the macroeconomic variables, we identified a strong relationship between errors of 
deficit forecast and GDP growth assumption or its components, such as private consumption 
or gross fixed capital formation. Our analysis provides negative and statistically significant 
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parameters for the third power in the EC forecasts. In the majority of horizons, the effect is not 
strong. For example, the 3pp positive surprise in the consumption dynamics (i.e. dynamics of 
indicator is 3 percentage point higher comparing to the forecast) results in a higher deficit 
forecast error by 0.1pp for nowcasts and one-year forecasts made by the EC. A more severe 
problem occurs in cases of horizons longer than two years, where the response is equal to 0.6pp. 
This observation shows that the EC tends to overestimate the propensity of national 
governments to consolidate public finances. Similarly, during a slowdown, forecasts are likely 
to provide an overly pessimistic picture. 
Surprisingly, we see no coincidence between current account balances and government deficit 
forecast errors, even for long-term forecasts. The institutions forecast does not reflect 
propensity to simultaneous increase of external and fiscal deficit, despite strong 
macroeconomic foundations. 
In line with the findings of Pina and Venes (2011), we found evidence that the OECD and EC 
are overconfident in the positive effect of EDP corrective arm. The current year forecasts are 
optimistically biased by, respectively, 0.5pp and 0.3pp. In the case of the EC, this bias can lead 
to premature decisions regarding closing of the procedure. 
6. Conclusions 
Our study rejects the hypothesis that international institutions tend to stigmatize “populist” 
governments. However, we identify different and equally important problems associated with 
deficit forecasting. 
First, all of the agencies threat leniently heavily indebted countries. Some indulgence is visible 
for economies under corrective arms of excessive deficit procedure in case of EC and OECD 
as well. The motives for such a forecasting approach can only be guessed. For example, the 
institutions may not be willing to trigger negative confidence shocks. The problem could also 
be a result of excessive trust in government predictions. Nonetheless, the results of 
underestimating the scale of government deficits have consequences. Although Spain has 
managed to reduce its sovereign debt in relationship to its GDP, Italy, France, and Portugal are 
still heavily indebted. 
In the case of the EC, another problem relates to forecasting deficits in emerging economies. 
We found cyclical biases in the EC forecasts, which could be a result of insufficient resources 
being dedicated to forecasting. Other problems may be related to a lack of analysis of  
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documents in a country’s language or to acquiring information from a limited number of media 
outlets providing news coverage only in English. 
Finally, our research confirmed the existence of problems described in the academic literature, 
specifically, the selective positive bias for some countries (e.g. Portugal, Spain) and strong 
autocorrelations of forecast errors. Both problems undermine the credibility of international 
institution forecasting methods. 
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Table 1: Countries used in the panel by the international institution from which the 
data was sourced 
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) 
European Commission  
(EC) 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
China 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Slovak Republic 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea 
Latvia 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
Belgium 
Germany 
Estonia 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Finland 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Croatia 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Sweden 
United States 
Japan 
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Table 2: International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast errors – estimated models 
 T0 T1 T2 T3 
Fiscal forecast error (previous report) 0.47*** 
 (0.06,7.83) 
0.51*** 
(0.04,12.51) 
0.54*** 
(0.05,11.77) 
0.49***  
(0.05,9.72) 
GDP – forecast error 0.27*** 
 (0.05,4.92) 
0.25*** 
(0.06,4.24) 
0.15** 
(0.06,2.3) 
0.21***  
(0.08,2.66) 
GDP – forecast error (^3) 
  
0.01** 
 (0.00,2.5) 
0.00*  
(0,1.77) 
Constant 0.1** 
 (0.04,2.54) 
0.17*** 
(0.04,3.83) 
0.07 
 (0.05,1.51) 
-0.01  
(0.06, -0.16) 
Hungarian reform of retirement 
system - dummy 
-8.93*** 
 (0.44, -20.42)    
Basic diagnostics 
Cross-sections / Periods 34 / 22 34 / 20 34 / 15 34 / 13 
Observations 640 572 416 350 
R^2 / Adjusted R^2 0.42 / 0.36 0.62 / 0.59 0.57 / 0.52 0.68 / 0.64 
     
Redundant fixed effects tests - Statistic (p-value) 
Cross-section F 1.57 (0.02) 1.35 (0.10) 1.91 (0.00) 2.68 (0.00) 
Cross-section Chi-square 54.7 (0.01) 47.39 (0.05) 66.48 (0.00) 90.55 (0.00) 
Period F 1.34 (0.15) 6.32 (0.00) 0.9 (0.55) 2.23 (0.01) 
Period Chi-square 28.75 (0.09) 113.89 (0.00) 13.21 (0.43) 27.51 (0.00) 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.52 (0.01) 3.34 (0.00) 1.63 (0.01) 2.62 (0.00) 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 83.17 (0.01) 163.14 (0.00) 77.8 (0.00) 113.89 (0.00) 
Note: The estimated model indicates no significance of control variables related to institutional quality or certain 
governments. However, IMF deficit nowcasts and one year ahead forecasts are systematically biased—the constant is 
statistically significant and greater than zero. The forecast errors are not randomly distributed as well —a parameter 
corresponding to the previous iteration error is significant and positive. Therefore, autocorrelation of errors occurs. 
 
The relationship between macroeconomic surprises and deficits are positive, in line with the intuition. However, the cross-
section fixed effects tend to be statistically significant in the case of nearly every time horizon. Detailed discussion about their 
values is presented in table 5. 
 
*** denotes significance at α =0.01, ** denotes significance at α =0.05, * denotes significance at α =0.1 
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Table 3: European Commission (EC) forecast errors – estimated models 
 T0 T1 T2 
Fiscal forecast error (previous report) 
0.32*** 
 (0.07,4.34) 
0.47*** 
 (0.05,8.78) 
0.22*** 
 (0.07,3.05) 
Private Consumption – forecast error 
0.14** 
 (0.06,2.50) 
0.15*** 
 (0.05,2.81) 
0.46*** 
 (0.15,3.03) 
Private Consumption – forecast error^3 
0.00*** 
 (0.00, -2.90) 
0.00** 
 (0.00, -2.24) 
-0.02** 
 (0.01, -2.6) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
forecast error 
0.02* 
 (0.01,1.90) 
  
GFCF – forecast error^3 
0.00*** 
 (0.00, -2.75) 
  
Public Consumption – forecast error^3 
0.00*** 
 (0.00, -3.53) 
  
Wages – forecast error  
 -0.08** 
 (0.03, -2.59) 
 
GDP deflator forecast error 
 0.18*** 
 (0.05,3.66) 
 
Constant 
0.27*** 
 (0.07,3.89) 
0.48*** 
 (0.05,8.86) 
0.47** 
 (0.2,2.32) 
Polish reform of retirement system – 
dummy 
-9.64*** 
 (0.34, -28.31) 
  
Polish reform of retirement system – 
dummy 2 
 -8.89*** 
 (0.31, -29.06) 
 
Hungarian reform of retirement system 
– dummy 
-6.24*** 
 (0.36, -17.56) 
  
Hungarian reform of retirement system 
– dummy 2 
-6.53*** 
 (0.64, -10.22) 
  
EDP 
-0.29* 
 (0.15, -1.86)  
0.73* 
 (0.43,1.72) 
Basic diagnostics 
Cross-sections / Periods 26 / 18 26 / 18 26 / 8 
Observations 
468 468 208 
R^2 / Adjusted R^2 
0.62 / 0.57 0.59 / 0.55 0.59 / 0.55 
    
Redundant fixed effects test-statistics (p-value) 
Cross-section F 1.95 (0.00) 6.34 (0.00) 1.34 (0.14) 
Cross-section Chi-square 51.91 (0.00) 150.6 (0.00) 37.4 (0.05) 
Period F 2.1 (0.01) 13.51 (0.00) 4.52 (0.00) 
Period Chi-square 38.7 (0.00) 215.33 (0.00) 35.47 (0.00) 
Cross-Section/Period F 1.94 (0.00) 9.34 (0.00) 2.67 (0.00) 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 83.95 (0.00) 317.68 (0.00) 84.72 (0.00) 
Note: There is no evidence that the EC tends to stigmatize populist governments or those with lower institutional quality. 
However, weak evidence of indulgence for countries under excessive deficit procedure is visible (negative beta in the case 
of nowcast). 
 
Similar to the case of the IMF, both constants and parameters corresponding to the deficit forecast error in the previous 
report are positive and statistically significant. The latter confirms autocorrelation of forecast errors. The cross-country 
fixed effects are non-redundant as well.  
 
Additionally, parameters corresponding to wages in the one year ahead equation and to the third power of consumption in 
the two-year horizon are negative. As a result, in case of stronger positive macroeconomic surprises, we do not observe an 
adequate deficit reduction. The problem is likely a result of overestimating governments’ propensity to reduce deficits during 
an economic expansion.  
 
*** denotes significance at α =0.01, ** denotes significance at α =0.05, * denotes significance at α =0.1 
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Table 4: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecast 
errors – estimated models 
 T0 T1 T2 
Fiscal forecast error (previous report) 0.29*** 
 (0.08,3.52) 
0.47*** 
 (0.07,6.52) 
0.22*** 
 (0.08,2.86) 
GDP – forecast error 
  
0.28*** 
 (0.1,2.86) 
Private Consumption – forecast error 
 
0.14** 
 (0.07,2.16)  
Private Consumption – forecast 
error^3 
0.05** 
 (0.02,2.17)   
Gross Fixed Capital Formation – 
forecast error 
0.04*** 
 (0.01,3.01)   
GFCF – forecast error^3 
0.00*** 
 (0.00, -3.11)   
Constant 
0.32*** 
 (0.06,5) 
0.16*** 
 (0.06,2.92) 
0.56*** 
 (0.12,4.73) 
Polish reform of retirement system – 
dummy 
-9.87*** 
 (0.32, -30.71)   
Polish reform of retirement system – 
dummy 2  
-8.4*** 
 (0.4, -20.95)  
Hungarian reform of retirement 
system – dummy 
-7.96*** 
 (0.31, -25.88)   
Hungarian reform of retirement 
system – dummy 2  
-7.44*** 
 (0.82, -9.09)   
EDP 
-0.51*** 
 (0.16, -3.23)  
-0.88** 
 (0.38, -2.31) 
Basic diagnostics 
Cross-sections / Periods 28 / 17 28 / 15 28 / 6 
Observations 448 392 155 
R^2 / Adjusted R^2 0.69 / 0.65 0.67 / 0.63 0.67 / 0.63 
    
Redundant fixed effects tests - Statistic (Prob) 
Cross-section F 2.46 (0.00) 2.39 (0.00) 1.47 (0.08) 
Cross-section Chi-square 69.45 (0.00) 66.94 (0.00) 44.68 (0.02) 
Period F 1.66 (0.05) 2.42 (0.00) 0.5 (0.78) 
Period Chi-square 29.08 (0.02) 36.61 (0.00) 3.2 (0.67) 
Cross-Section/Period F 2.22 (0.00) 2.56 (0.00) 1.31 (0.15) 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 96.75 (0.00) 103.84 (0.00) 46.87 (0.04) 
Note: There is no evidence that the OECD tends to stigmatize populist governments or those with lower institutional quality. 
However, there are similar problems with OECD forecasts, like those of the other institutions; i.e., we found systematic 
bias, autocorrelation of forecasts, and existence of statistically significant country effects. 
 
Additionally, this institution put too much confidence in the corrective arm of excessive deficit procedure. Countries under 
EC supervision are projected to consolidate their budget deficits at a rate which is later not achieved. 
 
*** denotes significance at α =0.01, ** denotes significance at α =0.05, * denotes significance at α =0.1 
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Table 5: Cross country fixed effects – a summary 
 European Commission 
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development  
International Monetary Fund 
Forecast horizon T0 T1 T2 T0 T1 T2 T0 T1 T2 T3 
Australia    -0.12 -0.13 -0.42 -0.33 -0.59 -0.59 -1.67 
Austria -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.24 -0.01 0.12 0.08 0.57 
Belgium -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.18 -0.24 -0.29     
Brazil       -0.30 -0.45 -0.41 -3.22 
Bulgaria -0.15 0.05 -0.23    0.11 0.05 -0.13 0.47 
Canada    0.51 0.47 0.51     
China       0.06 -0.32 -0.79 -1.57 
Croatia -0.16 -0.09 -0.06    0.05 0.70 0.96 1.58 
Czech Republic 0.27 0.42 0.95 0.10 0.29 0.98 0.30 0.65 0.89 2.78 
Denmark 0.69 0.72 1.01 0.55 0.72 1.25 0.56 0.60 0.81 1.69 
Estonia 0.21 0.11 0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.47 -0.13 -0.01 -0.08 0.48 
Finland -0.21 -0.39 -0.35 -0.20 -0.43 -0.49 0.09 0.01 -0.18 -0.57 
France 0.11 -0.04 -0.31 0.07 -0.21 0.15 -0.05 -0.07 -0.19 -1.24 
Germany 0.02 0.11 0.47 -0.11 0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.29 0.44 1.18 
Hungary -0.06 -0.44 -0.67 0.03 -0.05 -0.69 -0.09 0.31 0.16 1.08 
India       -0.09 0.03 -0.03 0.58 
Indonesia       0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.18 
Israel    0.36 0.22 0.53     
Italy -0.17 -0.33 -0.74 -0.25 -0.39 -0.75 0.00 -0.07 -0.20 -0.39 
Japan 0.01 0.14 0.42 0.71 0.86 1.13 0.36 0.11 0.23 1.21 
Korea    0.02 0.19 0.28 0.04 0.16 -0.09 -0.16 
Latvia 0.07 0.44 1.15 0.08 -0.54 -1.01 -0.06 -0.16 0.03 0.12 
Lithuania -0.08 0.14 0.30    -0.19 0.66 0.84 2.66 
Luxembourg 0.56 0.55 1.33 0.16 0.37 0.58     
Malta 0.53 0.22 0.50        
Netherlands 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.48 -0.02 0.17 0.65 1.82 
New Zealand    0.29 0.17 -0.33 0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.27 
Norway    -0.25 -0.27 1.14 -0.10 -0.37 -1.07 -2.71 
Poland 0.23 0.30 -0.08 0.35 0.33 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.14 
Portugal -1.07 -0.97 -1.60 -0.73 -0.72 -0.55 -0.88 -0.53 -0.14 -1.46 
Romania -0.07 -0.08 -0.05    -0.22 -0.23 -0.51 -0.71 
Russia       0.13 0.39 0.39 1.23 
Slovakia -0.05 0.12 0.19 -0.07 0.06 -0.43 0.02 0.18 0.39 1.30 
South Africa       -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.44 
Spain -0.56 -0.57 -1.80 -0.48 -0.89 -0.42 -0.51 -0.48 -0.25 -1.28 
Sweden 0.11 -0.12 -0.07 -0.15 -0.07 -0.07 0.30 0.23 0.03 -0.29 
Switzerland    -0.32 -0.05 -0.52 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 0.06 
United Kingdom 0.16 0.13 0.01 -0.10 0.02 0.09 0.22 0.22 -0.23 0.01 
United States -0.30 -0.35 -0.56 -0.57 -0.94 -1.12 0.38 0.07 0.11 0.86 
The values of the fixed effects for Portugal and Spain are lower compared to those for the other countries. The discrepancy between their values 
and cross-country means frequently exceeds two standard deviations for different institutions and different horizons. Blank cells indicate that the 
country was not part of a data panel.  
 
